Staff Report
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
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Executive Summary
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Subcommittee's Focus on the Institutional Response
Encouraged by prominent scientists, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in 1987 began a review of the institutional response to cases of alleged or suspected scientific misconduct by scientists involved in Federally supported research. At that time, the problem was readily discernible. When situations of possible scientific misconduct arose, the institution's response generally was to walk the whistleblower out the door, sweep the problems under the rug, and to protect, at all costs, the reputations of the senior scientists. As one scientist explained, "It was as if they had their own fiefdoms whereby they set their own rules."
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Even as the Subcommittee began to see some progress at research institutions, it was evident that effort had been geared toward research institutions outside the Federal government. At the time, over a billion dollars was being spent at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on intramural research. Consequently, it was important to determine if the same unwillingness to deal effectively with cases of potential misconduct observed in non-Federal institutions also existed within the Federal government's own research community. As a result, the staff was directed to conduct a case study involving allegations of misconduct in an intramural research program.
B. HHS/NIH's Sorry History of Misconduct Investigations
At this time, the Subcommittee was investigating the Laboratory of Tumor Cell Biology (LTCB) within the National Cancer Institute (NCI) at NIH, due to allegations of kickbacks and diversion of Federal funds by two prominent scientists within that laboratory. Ultimately, both investigations resulted in felony convictions. As a result, in 1989, when allegations of scientific misconduct resurfaced against the chief of that laboratory, allegations which had first been raised in 1985-86, the Subcommittee was in a good position to use the LTCB as its intramural case study.
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Drs. Gallo and Popovic claim that the names MOV and IIIb represented distinct, genuine LTCB isolates. These claims cannot be substantiated. According to the HHS OIG, Dr. Popovic merely renamed his LAV cell lines "MOV" (6/10/94 Investigative Memorandum; p. 4). As for the putative "IIIb" isolate, according to the OIG, there is reason to doubt that the experiment that reportedly produced this isolate was performed (op. cit., p. 21), and there is no evidence that a "IIIb" isolate ever existed independent of the IP virus. The Subcommittee investigation produced these same findings -- and more (see below).
With the June 1993 publication of analyses performed for OSI by Roche Molecular Systems (Nature, 363, pp. 466 - 469), it is a proven fact that MOV and IIIb are the IP virus "LAI" (formerly designated "LAV"). The question is how this came to be, i.e., did Drs. Gallo and/or Popovic deliberately and knowingly misappropriate the IP virus or were they unknowing, innocent victims of an accidental contamination of their cultures with the IP virus? Or is the truth some variation of these alternatives?
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But the occurrence of contamination at other laboratories shows only that contamination is possible, not that contamination is what really happened at the LTCB. In this regard, it is very pertinent that Gallo and Popovic claimed, for years, that contamination by the IP virus did not happen, could not have happened at the LTCB, because the IP virus did not grow. Dr. Gallo's own remarks to U.S. News & World Report, one of numerous public statements he made to the same effect, are particularly memorable in this regard. Responding to the suggestion that, "... Gallo may have mistakenly contaminated his experiments with the French virus," Dr. Gallo reportedly said this:
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Even Gallo and Popovic's own statements show they recognized at the time of its alleged origins -- or shortly thereafter -- that MOV might very well be the IP virus (for details see below). The fact is there is no evidence MOV ever was anything but the IP virus. This almost certainly is the reason no experiments were ever reported as being performed with MOV, although according to LTCB records, MOV was used for some of the LTCB's most important early HIV experiments, including development of the LTCB HIV antibody blood test. Indeed, the very existence of MOV remained a mystery, until the publication of a November 1989 investigative report in the Chicago Tribune.
As for "IIIb," the alleged LTCB "prototype" isolate, Drs. Gallo and Popovic claim that this isolate originated in a pool of samples from ten patients with AIDS/pre-AIDS. However, many important details of the experiment that allegedly resulted in IIIb have been found to be untrue (see below). Moreover, as revealed in 1993, none of the ten samples contains a virus that looks anything like the IP virus (four samples actually contained no virus), yet the IP virus is the only virus that resulted.
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But RF was not ready to be used, primarily because it had not been "scaled up," i.e., grown in the large quantities necessary for a blood test. Patent exigencies and other circumstances meant that any delay, including a delay to scale up RF, was out of the question (see below). Among these circumstances was the fact that Dr. Gallo had moved up the submission date for the LTCB papers by a full month and had committed to the journal Science that the papers would be submitted on Friday, March 30. Dr. Popovic told OSI he had planned to use this month for further work with RF.
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One notable example of these claims is an August 1985 paper, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS). In this paper, Dr. Gallo wrote the following:
"Since the fall of 1982, independent isolates of HTLV-III have been obtained in this laboratory ... from 101 AIDS and ARC patients and healthy donors at risk for AIDS ..."
ThePNASpaper included a detailed specification of the "minimum criteria used to identify new HTLV-III isolates." In addition, the paper asserted that,
"All 101 virus isolates were classified as members of the type-III subgroup of HTLV based on their immunological reactivity with specific monoclonal antibody or hyperimmune antisera and by their cytopathic effect ..." (Salahuddin, Gallo et al.; PNAS, 1985; pp. 5530-5533).
Dr. Gallo made repeated references to his putative other isolates, particularly during the French/American dispute, when he included claims similar to those above in numerous memoranda and similar documents to HHS officials and attorneys. There was Therewas just one problem: the claims were not true, as Gallo himself admitted to Subcommittee staff, in 1993, when -- concerning the claim that he had 101 confirmed HIV isolates, including isolates dating from the Fall of 1982 -- Dr. Gallo said this:
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As for Dr. Gallo's claims that the RF isolate, because it was an alternative to the IP virus for use in the LTCB HIV blood test, was itself proof positive that there was no misappropriation -- these claims cannot be substantiated (seebelowfor a review of the evidence). Even Dr. Gallo's attorney has finally conceded that RF was not ready to be used for an HIV antibody blood test (7/94 "Critique of Dr. Hadley's Response to Nicholas Wade's 'The Vindication of Robert Gallo'").
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"... we are the original, first and joint inventors ... of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought ..."
The real inventors Therealinventors of the HIV blood test were the IP scientists, who had developed and begun to use their blood test the previous Summer (1983). Dr. Gallo knew about the IP blood test. In fact, as early as September 1983, Dr. Gallo and his colleagues actually sent LTCB AIDS patients' samples to Paris to be assayed with the IP blood test.
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Dr. Popovic's response to Dr. Fischinger's request concerning this major area of oversight was a nonresponse, a transparent evasion of Dr. Fischinger's request (seebelow). Even Dr. Fischinger should have recognized something was being withheld from him, something was amiss. But Dr. Fischinger, so far as is known, did nothing. He permitted his report to stand, a report containing the blanket assertion that,
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Yet at the very moment HHS was dispatching a September 6, 1985 rejection of the IP demands, HHS officials were confronted with damning new evidence that strongly challenged the claims of Gallo et al. On September 5, HHS officials traveled to the NIH, where they were told by laboratory chief Dr. Malcolm Martin about experiments performed in his laboratory that showed the IP and LTCB viruses were genetically identical, with the LTCB virus descended from the IP virus, and not the reverse. The following day, the same HHS officials travelled to the HHS Centers for Disease Control (CDC) where they learned that the IP scientists discovered HIV and made a blood test fully the equal of the LTCB test, long before Gallo et al. But these dramatic revelations did not in any respect alter HHS' course. In fact, HHS' only action was to ask Dr. Gallo to provide a further response. Meanwhile, HHS officials "deep-sixed" the extensive documentation they had been given to substantiate the Martin and CDC conclusions (see below). Some of this evidence was withheld from the Subcommittee until late 1993.
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HHS attorneys manifested particularly severe memory deficits. During his October 8, 1992 interview by Subcommittee staff, HHS attorney Richard Riseberg emitted a remarkable number of "I don't know," "I don't recall," and "I can't help you there" responses concerning a number of critical events at which he personally was present. Riseberg claimed he was merely "asked to go along" to these events. HHS Attorney Darrel Grinstead, in his September 22 and September 30, 1992 interviews, took a similar tack, although on some critical issues, besides repeating, "I don't recall," Grinstead added this:
"I wouldn't tell you even if I did recall. That was between client and attorney."
NCI and NIH Directors Drs. Vincent DeVita and James Wyngaarden each denied any significant responsibility for the defense of Gallo et al. Yet each said the other was importantly involved. Dr. DeVita told Subcommittee staff that Dr. Wyngaarden took on an especially prominent role in matters relating to AIDS and that Wyngaarden "liked to deal with international stuff." Consequently, according to DeVita, Wyngaarden took on responsibility for discussions with IP officials and officials of the French Government, including discussions about possible monetary settlements, creation of an "official" scientific chronology, and other significant matters. Dr. Wyngaarden, by contrast, pointed to numerous instances in which DeVita and NCI by-passed the office of the NIH Director, dealing directly with HHS authorities, Congressional leaders, and even the White House.
Both Drs. Wyngaarden and DeVita, as well as every other key player at HHS, pointed to Lowell Harmison as the man in charge of the U.S. defense of Gallo et al., particularly during the critical early months of the French/American dispute. Attorney Richard Riseberg described Harmison as the "linchpin" of the HHS defense, who "understood the implications of the scientific information." Dr. Wyngaarden described Harmison as "on top of this," and the "chief individual" in the HHS defense. Dr. DeVita described Harmison as "running the show," and attorney Darrel Grinstead described Harmison as his "most regular client."
Despite these characterizations, Dr. Harmison claimed little or no recollection of most major elements of the French/American dispute, particularly his own role. Dr. Harmison claimed he was unable even to describe his job, as in this exchange during a hearing in Executive Session:
Q: Do you remember what your job was?
A: I think I was involved in the policy and the science of it.
Q: You were involved in the policy. And how were you involved in the policy?
A: I think the records that you have collected should express that.
Q: I am asking you. You are here to help us. Please tell us.
A: I have said, there were discussions with people as a normal part of the process of meetings --
Q: Who presided at these discussions?
A: I may have presided. It may have been the AIDS Executive Task Force.
Q: You may have? Do you remember whether you presided? Do you remember if somebody else presided? Do you remember if nobody presided? Do you not remember if anybody presided?
A: I don't remember.
Q: Do you remember there were discussions?
A: I think this is a very circular point. I have explained my policies and how I did things (7/21/93 hearing transcript; pp. 121 - 122).
Dr. Harmison also evinced a curious perspective concerning what was relevant vis-a-vis the French/American dispute. In response to a question about the key issue of the dates on which the IP and LTCB scientists created and began to work with their HIV antibody blood tests, Dr. Harmison said,
"I don't recall with respect to that date. That is to me not relevant. I don't recall, if I knew ... I said I can't recall. To me it is irrelevant because I can't recall it" (op. cit., p. 175).
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The April 23, 1984 filing of a United States patent application for the HIV antibody blood test of Gallo et al. was a defining event for HHS as well as the LTCB scientists. The commercialization of the IP virus in and of itself would violate the terms of the IP transfer agreement that accompanied the virus sample (see below for further details); the patent application further "upped the ante" dramatically for all concerned. The reputational and potential financial benefits of a blood test patent were very significant. Equally significant were the potential legal consequences of breaching the terms of the transfer agreement, and the potential legal, even criminal consequences for breaching United States patent laws and regulations.
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Because prior invention, use, or publication is a bar to a United States patent, applicants for a U.S. patent are required by law to disclose to PTO any information of which they are aware concerning such prior work. U.S. patent applicants thus are charged with duties of candor and full disclosure toward PTO, duties which U.S. courts have called "uncompromising" (Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 219 USPQ 857, 861 (1983).
The PTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedures says this about the duties of candor and disclosure:
"A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application ... All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent" (emphasis added; 37 CFR §1.56 [a], cited in Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, 2001, "Duty of Disclosure, Candor, and Good Faith," p. 2000-2).
The PTO Manual says the duty of disclosure applies to information that "... a person ... 'knew or should have known' would be material ...," to "... material information they are aware of, or reasonably should have been aware of ..."
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"The duty to disclose material information extends to information such individuals are aware of prior to or at the time of filing the application or become aware of during the prosecution thereof" (emphasis added; op. cit., pp. 2000-4 - 2000-6).
The PTO Manual also specifies the consequences for a pending patent application in the event of fraud or violation of the duty of disclosure:
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The IP scientists were first to publish on the AIDS virus (Barre-Sinoussi et al.,Science,May 1983). The LTCB scientists did not publish on the AIDS virus until nearly one year later; by the time they did so, the IP scientists had made numerous scientific presentations and published a number of scientific papers reporting additional work on the isolation, growth, and characterization of the virus.
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But no information about the IP LAV blood test was disclosed to PTO by Gallo et al. when they submitted their patent applications, except as part of the single misleading reference noted above. Neither was there disclosure of an important paper by the IP scientists, published weeks before Gallo et al. submitted their patent applications. In this paper (Vilmer et al.,The Lancet,1984, pp. 753 - 757), the authors described the methods of the IP ELISA. Vilmer et al. also reported that antibodies to the core protein of their new retrovirus (by now there were a number of isolates besides the original LAV),
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When the PTO examiner, again belatedly, learned of the existence of the Vilmer et al. paper, she cited it as prior art to Gallo et al. and used it to repeatedly reject claims in several Gallo et al. CIPs.
3. Receipt and Use of the IP Virus:
Beginning in July 1983, the LTCB scientists received repeated shipments of the IP virus, along with serum from patient "BRU," the patient from whom the first IP virus isolate was obtained. (At the time, the virus samples were all designated "LAV" and were believed to have originated with patient BRU; however, one sample, received at the LTCB in September 1983, had been accidentally contaminated in Paris with another IP virus, from patient LAI. These circumstances were revealed in 1991 in a paper by the IP scientists and confirmed in 1993 in a study by Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., commissioned by the NIH Office of Scientific Integrity. The critical fact is that both BRU and LAI are IP virus isolates.)
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The LTCB scientists performed all their seminal HIV experiments with the IP virus isolate LAI, first identified as LAV, then as "MOV," and finally, as "HTLV-IIIb." Dr. Gallo and his colleagues assert that "MOV" and "IIIb" were genuine LTCB isolates that were accidentally contaminated with LAI. But aside from Gallo/Popovic's assertions, there is little or no evidence to substantiate that MOV and IIIb ever were anything other than LAI (seebelow).
The knowledge and experience the LTCB scientists gained from their use of LAI as "LAV" was very substantial (see below for details). The "Richards Committee," the oversight committee for the OSI investigation appointed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), said on this subject that,
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The BRU virus sample received at the LTCB in July 1983 was used to obtain the first LTCB electron micrograph (EM) correctly identifying the suspected AIDS virus as a "lentivirus." Subsequently, a culture of BRU virus, as well as BRU serum received from the IP scientists were used for an experiment the U.S. Government attorneys later would represent to PTO as the "reduction to practice" of the LTCB blood test invention.
The LAI virus sample was the first isolate the LTCB scientists grew in permanent cell lines. In fact, it was the first virus the LTCB scientists even attempted to grow. Dr. Popovic told OSI he chose the IP virus for this crucial experiment because it "... was the best defined isolate from an AIDS-like patient ..."
The IP virus, under its own name, grew at least two-to-three months at the LTCB, in two permanent cell lines; by Dr. Gallo's own admission to OSI, the growth of the IP virus was "significant and continuous."
Yet in their patent applications -- and from the very first of their scientific papers on the AIDS virus, the LTCB scientists failed to disclose their work on the IP virus, particularly the fact that they had grown the virus for several months in permanent cell lines. Drs. Gallo and Popovic even hid their growth of the IP virus in permanent lines from the IP scientists. Dr. Popovic told OSI that when he telephoned Dr. Montagnier to tell him that he (Popovic) had "learned how to handle the virus,"
"What I didn't tell him was that the virus grows very well in permanent T-cell lines ... I didn't consider that it was my duty to inform him in detail, that we have a breakthrough with this virus" [the IP virus, "LAI"] (emphasis added) 6/26/90 OSI interview; pp. 111 - 112).
Samples of the two LAI cell lines were successfully assayed by EM and immunofluorescence assay (IFA) in mid-December, 1983. In fact, as late as the end of 1983, the only AIDS virus cultures for which Gallo et al. had EMs correctly identifying the presence of a lentivirus were the LAI cell lines. One of the LAI EMs was published by Gallo et al., identified as an LTCB isolate of the AIDS virus (see below).
The Subcommittee's investigation showed that records of both the EM and IFA experiments on the LAI cell lines were redacted/obscured before they were produced to the IP attorneys during the French/American dispute. It seems impossible that this was anything other than a deliberate act of deception, an act that significantly disadvantaged the IP, because it was impossible to discern that the IP virus grew productively and was used for successful experiments months after the virus arrived at the LTCB. The redacted/obscured records permitted Gallo et al. to continue to promulgate the myth that the IP virus did not grow more than transiently at the LTCB.
The LAI cell lines, with the virus name identified only by "L," were the first two cultures tested by the LTCB scientists using their first reagent specific for the AIDS virus, a reagent itself made with the IP virus. Both LAI cultures were positive in the IFA, confirming they were infected with the AIDS virus. These are vitally important data; they directly contradict Dr. Gallo's subsequent sworn statements that (l) prior to the submission of the LTCB patent applications, he and his colleagues had no evidence the LTCB and IP viruses were the same kind of virus and (2) prior to the allowance of the LTCB blood test patent, he saw no evidence the IP virus was the cause of AIDS (see below).
The IP virus LAI, first renamed "MOV" and later renamed "IIIb," was used by the LTCB scientists for numerous significant experiments, including these: (l) the first large-scale production and mass production of the AIDS virus; (2) creation of the first HIV-specific reagents; (3) development and refinement of the LTCB antibody blood test, followed by its commercialization world-wide; (4) creation of the first cDNA probes and molecular clones of the AIDS virus.
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On March 6, 1984, according to Gallo at al., the LTCB prototype virus, "HTLV-IIIb," allegedly derived from a pool of samples taken from ten patients, replaced "MOV" in the LTCB blood test. The laboratory notes do not reflect this change.
Drs. Gallo and Popovic claim that IIIb, like MOV, was a genuine LTCB isolate, independent of LAI. But the Subcommittee's investigation found that aside from Gallo/Popovic's assertions, there is no evidence to support this claim and there is ample reason to question it.
As confirmed by the Roche analysis, "IIIb" -- like "MOV" -- is the IP virus LAI.
According to the report of the HHS OIG,
"... there is no evidence there ever was a IIIb isolate independent of LAV [LAI] (6/10/94 Investigative Memorandum; p. 22)
and
"There is reason to doubt that the 'pool' experiment ... really was done, or if done, that it ever produced anything other than LAV/LAI" (op. cit.; p. 21).
The Subcommittee's investigation resulted in numerous findings that cast doubt on the pool experiment. Contrary to the claims of Gallo and Popovic, including claims in their patent applications, several of the putative pool samples contained no HIV, while others did not even come from AIDS or pre-AIDS patients . Furthermore, as seen in the LTCB's ' s own laboratory notes, contrary to the claims of the Popovic et al. paper, claims reiterated in official memoranda by Dr. Gallo, the putative constituent "pool" samples did not show "high RT activity in primary culture" (8/19/85 Gallo-to-Fischinger memorandum; p. 3). Only one of the ten putative pool samples was tested and found to be RT+ before the supposed pool experiment; several of the samples were not tested at all, while others were tested and found to be RT-. The notion that Dr. Popovic used such samples in an effort to obtain a high-titre virus-producing cell line defies credulity.
It also is noteworthy that there is no mention of a pool in the Popovic et al. Science paper that allegedly reported the isolation of "IIIb." In fact, no "IIIb" virus appeared in any of the four May 1984 Science papers published by the LTCB. And in the first paper in which "IIIb" did appear, the experiments said to have been performed with IIIb were discovered by Subcommittee staff to have been performed with "MOV," i.e., the name of the virus was simply changed. (At least one other paper has been found with the same name change; the total number has not yet been established.)
The evidence above points to the very real possibility that the name "IIIb" and the putative "pool" experiment were created after the fact, specifically to obscure the origins of the virus used for the LTCB HIV antibody blood test. "MOV," reportedly used for the development and first several months of the test's use, could not be reported in scientific papers, since the LTCB scientists knew or had reason to know it was the IP virus. Certainly the cover story that the LTCB scientists were uncertain of the origins of MOV provided no real cover, for by this account, Gallo et al. could not even be certain that their "MOV" AIDS virus came from a patient with AIDS! Thus, none of the seminal experiments said to have been performed with "MOV" were ever so reported in the scientific literature.
To publish and patent a blood test, the LTCB scientists needed to provide a plausible origin for their prototype virus; the first official document in which the name "IIIb" appeared was the LTCB blood test patent application. By introducing a supposed "new" virus, "IIIb, " one said to be derived from a pool of ten samples, and by claiming they did not know which of the ten putative viruses "took," the LTCB scientists attempted, for years, to divert attention from the possibility -- now confirmed as true -- that the virus that "took," in fact the only virus that existed, was LAI.
Several important pieces of evidence point to the probability that if the "pool" experiment actually was done (versus LAI/MOV merely being renamed "IIIb"), LAI was deliberately used as part of that experiment. According to three sworn affidavits of Dr. Francoise Barre-Sinoussi, the IP scientist widely regarded as the true discoverer of the AIDS virus, in 1992, Dr. Popovic acknowledged that he mixed LAV (LAI) with other LTCB samples, as part of his "pool" experiment. According to Dr. Barre-Sinoussi, Dr. Popovic told her he did this to obtain a high-titre cell line, not knowing the IP virus alone would grow out of the pool. Use of the IP virus in this manner would not have been proscribed by the IP/LTCB transfer agreement. What was specifically proscribed, however, was commercialization of the virus, which is precisely what Gallo/Popovic did when they patented and licensed the LTCB blood test made with LAI/LAV.
Dr. Popovic denies making such an admission to Dr. Barre-Sinoussi; however, Dr. Popovic himself came very close to making the same statements to OSI. Describing the rationale for his "pool" experiment, Dr. Popovic said this:
"We told ourselves it should be the AIDS virus, whatever AIDS virus was if that we can get it is fine. It wasn't the question of precise isolation ...
"I was fully aware of it (of the problem of precise origin of the viral isolate). But what is wrong about using this approach when precisely the agent is not determined and I wanted to repeat the experiments and to show that really I can repeat it to achieve infection and long-term production of the virus. So one of the approaches was to pool culture fluids from samples of several AIDS patients ...
"If I have a cell line which is virus positive, and I take another virus-positive cell line and mix together and put together LAV, it is bona fide experiment? What is difference if I take from one of these flasks, I have two different and mix together, and then I put in one cell line, or I have cell line which is positive and I take the virus and put it there? What is the difference between these two?" (emphasis added; 6/26/90 OSI interview; excerpted from transcript pp. 68 - 70 ) .
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At the point the decision was made to proceed with patenting and commercialization of the LTCB blood test, Dr. Popovic raised strong objections to use of the "pool" virus for the LTCB HIV blood test, arguing instead for another HIV isolate called "RF." That Dr. Popovic objected to "IIIb" at this particular juncture is highly revealing. "IIIb" reportedly had been in use for the LTCB blood test for several weeks; it was sent to an LTCB contractor for large-scale production some weeks earlier. "IIIb" had been used to generate most or all of the blood test data reported in the LTCB papers that would be published inSciencein May 1984. Dr. Popovic objected to none of this. But suddenly, by his own account, at the point a "IIIb" blood test was about to be patented and commercialized, Dr. Popovic became acutely anxious about the "origins" of the virus supposedly used for the test.
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"I can see Mika standing in front of me with his pipe and saying, you know, 'why don't we go with RF with the blood test' and I saying, you know, 'what the hell' -- you know, 'what for.' And he said, 'well, it is -- we have the lineage much better defined. We know exactly what it is all the way'" (12/1/90 OSI interview; transcript p. 106).
But there Butthere were two major problems with the possible use of RF for the LTCB blood test. First, contrary to Dr. Gallo's repeated assertions, RF was not ready to be used, and there could be no certainty about when it would be ready and (2) there was no time for delay.
3. RF Was Not Ready:
"RF," the putative contender to "IIIb" for use in the LTCB blood test, was not ready to be used at the point the "go-ahead" decision for the blood test was made. (Other potential contenders occasionally mentioned by Gallo et al. were even farther behind.) RF at all times lagged behind "IIIb" in its growth and titre, and there were troublesome anomalies and gaps in the data for RF. Specifically, prior to the Gallo/Popovic discussion about which isolate to use for the LTCB blood test:
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"... was a lower producer than the IIIb in our hands" (1/28/91 OSI interview; transcript p. 29).
4. There Was No Time for Delay:
Dr. Gallo frequently invoked RF and his putative "other isolates" to argue that he had no motive to deliberately use the IP virus for the LTCB blood test. In so doing, Dr. Gallo greatly overstated the "readiness" of RF and ignored or significantly understated the time that would have been required to ready RF (or any other isolate) for use. Here are examples of Dr. Gallo's statements to OSI in this regard:
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By at least February 1984, by Dr. Gallo's own account, he had told top NCI officials he believed he had isolated the AIDS virus and was working on a virus antibody blood test. Documentary evidence and testimony shows that during the following weeks, these officials pressed Gallo and his associates with increasing urgency concerning when he would be ready to announce his "discoveries."
By mid-March 1984, Dr. Gallo had told the CDC scientists, in general terms, about his "discoveries," including his plans to publish several papers in in the near future. By this time, work on several of the papers, including the blood test paper, had commenced.
In mid-March 1984, Dr. Gallo lectured in Marseilles, France, announcing the isolation of "HTLV-III" from patients with AIDS.
On March 30, 1984, Gallo et al. submitted four papers, including the blood test paper (reportedly based largely on the so-called "IIIb") to Science, for publication on May 4. Dr. Gallo had communicated with Science some weeks earlier and made special arrangements for submission and publication of the papers. Also on March 30, Drs. Gallo and DeVita travelled to HHS headquarters to brief the Assistant Secretary of Health Dr. Edward Brandt about the LTCB "discoveries."
On April 5 - 6, 1984, Dr. Gallo lectured to large audiences, first at Zurich and then at the IP, describing his laboratory's work with "HTLV-III" and recommending to his audience,
"following the literature over the next few months carefully and the story will be told in some detail."
On April 9, 1984, Dr. Gallo gave a tape-recorded interview to BBC reporter Martin Redfern, giving Redfern prepublication copies of the four Science papers. Within a week, news stories about the LTCB's "discoveries" began to appear in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and then in the international media.
On April 9, 1984, "IIIb" reportedly was sent for mass production preparatory to its release to the manufacturers/licensees of the Gallo et al. invention.
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Peter Fischinger telephoned the NIH patent attorneys to tell them that Gallo et al. had,
"... made a very important invention with world-wide significance. The Surgeon General intends to make an announcement in the very near future ... NCI wants a patent application on file before there is a statutory bar" (4/11/84 notes by NIH patent attorney Thomas Ferris).
The "statutory bar" to which Dr. Fischinger referred was a vital consideration. Unless Gallo et al. filed their United States blood test patent application before there was any disclosure of the invention, they would forfeit their foreign filing rights throughout the world. With news of the Gallo et al. blood test about to appear, much of it engineered by Dr. Gallo himself, it was essential that the Gallo et al. application be filed without any further delay. This is the reason Thomas Ferris reportedly told Peter Fischinger he (Ferris) would need the disclosures for the LTCB patent applications "ASAP."
Perhaps most important of all, around mid-March 1984, before the discussion with Dr. Popovic, Dr. Gallo moved forward by a full month the submission date for the four Science papers. The reason Dr. Gallo moved up the submission date is not certain; one plausible reason is that Dr. Gallo was concerned about establishing priority over the IP scientists, in light of the information Dr. Gallo was given in mid-March concerning the accurate performance of the IP blood test in the CDC comparative study.
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Thus, it is at least possible that a deliberate decision was made to patent and commercialize a blood test using the IP virus, both because there was no alternative to using that virus and because at the time of the decision, there was no discernible risk of discovery. More importantly, the evidence shows that by the Summer of 1984, when Dr. Gallo knew "his" virus almost certainly was the IP virus, he attempted to blame the IP scientists for "contaminating" the cell lines and when this failed, he suppressed the evidence of the viruses' identity and, for years, argued strenuously that they were genetically independent (see below).
C. Popovic et al.: The Rewriting of Science
The cover-up of the LTCB's work with the IP virus advanced to a more active phase in mid-March 1984, when Dr. Gallo systematically rewrote the manuscript for what would become a renowned LTCB paper (Popovic et al.; Science, 225, 1984, pp. 497-500), deleting Dr. Popovic's explicit references to his use of the IP virus and making it appear Dr. Popovic's seminal experiments had been performed with an authentic LTCB isolate. The extent of Dr. Gallo's revisions to Dr. Popovic's paper became clear during the OSI investigation, when Dr. Popovic suddenly produced two drafts of the paper bearing Dr. Gallo's edits. Dr. Popovic had secured these drafts with his sister in Czechoslovakia because, he said,
...
Similarly, a letter to the journal Nature by the LTCB scientists claimed that "HTLV-III, LAV, and ARV [a third isolate named "AIDS-Related Virus,"] are variants of the same virus" (Ratner et al., Nature, 313, 1985, p. 636). The Nature letter also introduced the geographical/temporal proximity explanation for the identity of the IP and LTCB prototype viruses, i.e., the viruses were claimed to be so much alike,
...
"... I remained deeply disturbed about the claim made for the IIIb viruses ... that they derived from pooled blood of several patients. It was very difficult in 1987 to convince many researchers that the AIDS viruses mutated inordinately rapidly. The IIIb interpretation gave the false impression that the virus was more stable than other signs were indicating" (4/12/89 Myers-to-Fauci; p. 2).
(Seeabovefor additional information about Dr. Myers' correspondence relating to the work of Gallo et al.)
At the same time that he was publishing misleading accounts of the LTCB's own comparisons of the IP and LTCB viruses, Dr. Gallo went to considerable lengths to prevent scientists whom he knew had obtained the IP virus from using "his" virus and "his" cell line (see this section of the Subcommittee report) to make their own comparisons. When one group of scientists compared the LTCB and IP viruses and pronounced them genetically "identical," Dr. Gallo intervened to stop publication of an associated manuscript. The paper was delayed for almost one year, when a greatly watered-down version was published, in an obscure journal rather than the prestigious journal for which the paper was originally intended.
...
"We would like a written statement from Dr. Popovic, and whoever else partook in the development of the HTLV-IIIb line, that LAV was never used in any connection in that complex infection sequence which led to the isolation of the HTLV-IIIb line."
Dr. Popovic prepared the preparedthe response to the August 23 memorandum. The response contained numerous unsubstantiable claims. Particularly noteworthy was Dr. Popovic's evasive response to Dr. Fischinger's requirement for a statement concerning the non-use of LAV in the "isolation" of IIIb:
...
"... my initialing of this report should not be interpreted as an indication to you ... or other officials in the Department that I am fully comfortable that the Department would prevail if the French were to proceed to press their claims through litigation."
At the same time sametime the Fischinger Report was getting its final sign-offs, Lowell Harmison was obtaining hard evidence from NIH and CDC scientists that (l) the IP and LTCB prototype viruses almost certainly were genetically identical, with the LTCB virus derived from the IP, and (2) the IP scientists were not only the discoverers of the AIDS virus, but also the inventors of the virus antibody blood test.
...
Dr. Martin also told Harmison about a forthcoming article in Science which was to demonstrate the diversity of numerous HIV isolates, with the notable exception of IIIb and LAV. Martin told Harmison,
...
"... a full trip through the record, the chronology, with no holds barred. All the data were described" (Chicago Tribune, December 31, 1991 ) .
Notes of another CDC participant say this scientist,
...
As early as late-1985, HHS attorneys were drafting successive versions of a settlement agreement, including at one point, a multi-million dollar cash payment to the IP. Attorneys' notes examined by Subcommittee staff show that HHS attorneys were concerned with avoiding the impression such a payout was an "admission of culpability." Presumably this is the same reason HHS had such difficulty agreeing to a reallocation of the royalties in 1994 (see below).
During 1986, as the Claims Court suit progressed and the PTO interference got under way, the HHS/DOJ attorneys struggled to craft a litigation strategy that fell somewhere between the truth and the law. Notes of a crucial "Lawyers Meeting," on April 8, 1986, referred to what the participants described as the "two-edged sword" that confronted the U.S. Government with respect to the identity of the IP and LTCB viruses. On the one hand, to refute the claim of derivation of the Gallo invention from the IP invention, the U.S. attorneys needed to argue that the IP and LTCB viruses were different. (At one meeting, HHS attorneys called this a "weak thread to rely on.")
...
The U.S. Government attorneys then decided to attempt the argument that Gallo et al. invented before Montagnier et al. The lawyers indicated that for this argument to succeed, one essential element was proof that Gallo et al. isolated the AIDS virus before the IP scientists did so, i.e., in 1982. No such proof existed, but that did not stop the attorneys from trying to manufacture it. Thus, in May 1986, when Gallo et al. published a letter to the journal Nature concerning their putative "early isolates," HHS and DOJ attorneys had significant input into its contents.
The Nature letter was written as a hasty rebuttal to the highly negative publicity associated with what the media called the "acutely embarrassing" revelation in March/April 1986 that a virus EM published by Gallo et al. in 1984, identified as an EM of "HTLV-III," actually was an EM of the IP virus. HHS and particularly, DOJ attorneys played a significant role in preparation of the Nature letter. DOJ attorney Thomas Byrnes edited Dr. Gallo's letter, adding a significant assertion that could not be substantiated, i.e., the claim that,
"The experimental results shown were obtained shortly after receipt of the samples, usually a matter of weeks" (Gallo et al., Nature, 321, 1986, p. 119).
In addition, in a cover letter to Dr. Gallo, Byrnes made clear why "early isolates" and early dates of experimental results were so important to the U.S. Government case:
"The dates set forth in this letter will be perceived as our earliest dates; for this reason the dates must be as early as possible. Another sample before September 1983 showing by EM the presence of an HTLV-III particle would be highly desirable."
No pre-September HIV SeptemberHIV EM was ever produced, for the simple reason that none existed. (Similarly, in late-Summer 1986, when PTO sought laboratory notes from Dr. Popovic pre-dating the IP priority dates, no data were produced.) The single example in theNatureletter of an alleged February 1983 HIV EM was significantly misleading. The EM was not even made until May 1983; the putative HIV particles were not identified until December 1985; and HIV was not isolated from the sample until 1986.
...
HHS produced fewer than half the documents it originally estimated were responsive to the IP FOIA request, and only after significant delays; numerous material, responsive documents were withheld. Often, the very existence of these documents was not disclosed to the IP attorneys, although such disclosure is required by the FOIA. Among the most significant withheld documents were the memoranda and data showing the genetic identity of the IP and LTCB viruses, provided by Malcolm Martin to Lowell Harmison, the records relating to the development of the LTCB HIV blood test, and the drafts of the Popovic et al. paper, showing the significant use of LAV at the LTCB.
Documents were produced in a scattered, haphazard fashion, with documents from several different LTCB scientists co-mingled, in no particular order, and without regard to dates.
Many documents were copied in such a manner that they were entirely illegible. When the IP attorneys sought access to the originals of these documents, they were denied.
Key entries in laboratory notes and related documents that would have undercut the U.S. position were whited out or otherwise obscured, with the result that highly significant data showing the success of the LTCB in growing LAV in permanent cell lines were eliminated (for details see above).
The information deficit resulting from the U.S. Government's abuse of the IP's FOIA request significantly disadvantaged the IP in its efforts to confirm its suspicions and learn the truth about the LTCB scientists' research. IP attorneys told Subcommittee staff that had they -- in 1986-87 -- possessed information wrongfully withheld from them that has only recently come to light, they would never have entered into the 1987 settlement with the U.S. Government.
...
"... the personal assistance of Dr. Gallo is of the utmost importance in pursuing these investigations" (June 30, 1986 motion for extension of time; pp. 3 - 5).
2. The Misinformation:
The U.S. Government pleadings, particularly those in the Claims Court and at PTO, contain numerous misleading claims. They also reflect numerous material omissions. The misinformation and material omissions are traceable directly to documents and statements prepared by Dr. Gallo and his LTCB colleagues, including numerous statements in the scientific literature, and documents and statements originating with Dr. Gallo's NCI and HHS superiors, including but not limited to Drs. Peter Fischinger and Lowell Harmison.
...
"In late l982 - early 1983, [Gallo] obtained a number of viral isolates including HTLV-III" (Opposition of Gallo et al. to the Motion of Montagnier et al. for Judgment; p. A8); (The LTCB scientists never tested any 1982 sample to confirm that it contained HIV; Dr. Gallo personally acknowledged this to Subcommittee staff. Thus, there was no evidence to substantiate that the claim of 1982 HIV isolates was true.)
" ... in February 1983, a further detection of the virus which would later be called HTLV-III was made which this time included electron microscopy as well as RT ..." (Gallo declaration; p. 1; appended to the U.S. Government motion above); (No EM of HIV was made at the LTCB in February 1983; the earliest EM, from May 1983, was not known to contain HIV-like particles until December 1985; see above).
Upon examination of the July LAV sample, "... no virus was found in this sample and it appears that virus initially present may have been killed in transit" (Opposition of Gallo et al. ..., p. A12); (by Gallo/ Popovic's own subsequent admissions, the July LAV sample was used for a number of significant experiments that confirmed the presence of virus associated with pre-AIDS and AIDS; see above).
"The receipt of sera (sic) by Gallo from Montagnier taken from the patient [BRU] ... is ... of no significance ... there is no evidence to indicate that the sera (sic) contained any antibodies to the AIDS virus" (op. cit., p. A13); (BRU serum was used for months at the LTCB to test virus cultures for the presence of the suspected AIDS virus. The BRU serum was the only serum the LTCB scientists possessed that reacted specifically with AIDS samples).
Concerning the IP virus received at the LTCB in September 1983, "Dr. Popovic did succeed in temporarily transmitting LAV to a cell line called HUT-78 and one other T-cell line. However, both transmissions were only temporary in nature" (Gallo declaration; p. 11); (By Dr. Gallo's own admission to OSI, growth of LAV at the LTCB was "significant and continuous"; see p. %%25).
"At no time prior to the filing of the Gallo application was it appreciated by anyone that LAV and HTLV-III were the same or even similar viruses" (Opposition of Gallo et al.... p. A22); "... there was no recognition by Gallo, Montagnier or anyone else of such similarity ... In fact, there was every reason to believe that the two compositions are substantially different (op. cit., p. 4); (Numerous pieces of evidence show that these statements are false. The evidence includes Dr. Gallo' s contemporaneous statements, as well as his admissions to OSI, plus Dr. Popovic's account of his own experiments, in the draft of Popovic et al. see above).
"... I was satisfied that HTLV-III had been proven to be the cause of AIDS, but I saw no evidence of this for LAV up through the allowance of the Gallo patents (Gallo declaration; p. 14); (Dr. Gallo's own papers [particularly the collaborative manuscripts dating from the Summer of 1984] plus numerous other items [e.g., Feorino et al., Science, July 6, 1984; Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, July 13, 1984; T. Beardsley, Nature, July 19, 1984; Cheingsong-Popov et al., The Lancet, September 1, 1984] show that at the specified time, LAV was widely recognized as the cause of AIDS).
"Neither of these inventions [the Gallo et al blood test and cell line] depended on or is derived from LAV. Isolates of the virus that is responsible for AIDS were available from many sources, and, in fact, it was from these independently established isolates that HTLV-III was found" (6/11/86 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; pp. 8 - 9); (The Gallo et al. blood test "invention" benefitted significantly from the IP and LTCB's scientists' work with LAV, not to mention the LTCB scientists' actual use of LAI/LAV to make their own test; see above).
"The scientific evidence is clear that HTLV-III and LAV are not so similar that HTLV-III can be said to be the progeny of LAV" (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint; p. 6); (There was no scientific basis for this claim; by his own admission, as early as the Summer of 1984, Dr. Gallo believed his virus and the IP virus were derived from the same source; by 1985, HHS was aware that Dr. Martin' s data showed "IIIb" was derived from LAI/LAV. Dr. Gallo has recently acknowledged to Subcommittee staff that by 1986, he knew the viruses were genetically identical.
"Continuing research revealed that LAV and HTLV-III were two different isolates of the AIDS virus" (Brief for Appellee the United States, p. 4); (see above).
The difference in nucleotide sequences of LAV and IIIb "... conclusively establishes that HTLV-III is not LAV by another name" (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery); p. 4; (see above).
"... Pasteur's statement that ''[I]t appears that Dr. Gallo and certain of his colleagues essentially took LAV, renamed it HTLV-III and the (sic) claimed and exploited it as their own' ... is an outrageous attempt to impugn the reputations of one of the world's foremost virologists and his coworkers" (Brief for Appellee the United States; pp. 4 - 5); (see above).
"... nothing material or relevant was withheld from the examiner" (Opposition of Gallo et al. ...; p. A20); (In fact, virtually everything Gallo et al. knew about the IP virus and the IP scientists' work was withheld from the PTO examiner. The materiality of the withheld information concerning the IP scientists' work was compellingly affirmed by PTO when it repeatedly cited that work as prior art to Gallo et al; see above).
VI. THE CONTEMPORARY COVER-UP
...
Dr. Healy demanded that an OSI draft report sharply critical of Dr. Gallo be rewritten. When her order for a rewrite was refused, Dr. Healy replaced the chief investigator with one more malleable. The resulting OSI final report was greatly "watered-down"; the majority of the negative comments about Dr. Gallo were incorporated into a confidential memorandum, never publicly released, that included these observations:
"... Dr. Gallo's conduct had in numerous respects fallen well short of the conduct expected of a responsible senior scientist and laboratory chief (p. l); The investigative team saw this as a significant failure on Dr. Gallo's part to comprehend the need for accuracy and complete truthfulness in research (p. 6); ... he [Dr. Gallo] thereby fostered conditions which provided the opportunity for the creation of falsified/fabricated data and falsified scientific reports" (p. 7) (2/18/92 Hallum-to-Diggs memorandum).
Simultaneous with Dr. Healy's rewrite order, NIH and HHS attorneys reviewed and dismissed as "not a problem" an OSI memorandum that documented the numerous misleading statements in the Gallo et al. patents and Dr. Gallo's 1986 sworn declaration. When the media obtained the OSI memorandum, in August 1991, NIH officials disparaged it as unofficial and unauthorized, and thereafter, studiously ignored its contents.
In early 1992, when the NAS-commissioned "Richards Committee" produced a report sharply critical of Dr. Gallo, Dr. Healy bypassed the committee and commissioned her own committee of top NIH scientists whom she called her "wise men." Dr. Healy told her "wise men" that everything about the committee and their participation would be completely confidential. In return, she -- without any advance warning -- required the committee members to sign a secrecy agreement. As a consequence, the very existence of the committee remained hidden for nearly two years.
Despite DrDespiteDr. Healy's efforts to handpick and control her "wise men," they decided Dr. Gallo should be fired as an NIH laboratory chief. One committee member expressed this determination as follows:
"... Gallo failed in his responsibilities as the head of the Laboratory. His behavior was seriously discordant with the 'Guidelines for the Conduct of Research in the Intramural Research Program at the NIH' ... The consequences of Gallo's failings have been substantial. At a minimum, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent on these investigations, the efforts of both the French and American groups have been diverted into unproductive activities and considerable damage has been inflicted on the scientific enterprise, in general ... I recommend that you remove Dr. Gallo from his position as Chief of the Laboratory ..."
Faced with Facedwith a finding she clearly did not want, Dr. Healy convened a second meeting of her committee. At this meeting, the "wise men," who had been assured that everything about the committee was entirely secret, suddenly found themselves confronted with Dr. Gallo and his attorney. The committee members were required to sit through a lengthy and entirely one-sided presentation by Dr. Gallo and his attorney in which all wrongdoing was denied, and in which it was suggested that Dr. Gallo was being hounded for accidental errors and inadvertent sloppiness in laboratory notekeeping -- "that could happen to any of you." At the conclusion of the meeting, Dr. Healy demanded a ruling from the committee as to whether Dr. Gallo had committed scientific misconduct. The committee members, who had examined none of the evidence, said they could not make such a judgment.
Dr. Healy's immediate response was to grant interviews with the Washington Post and Science, during which she disclosed the existence of her committee, and claimed Dr. Gallo "rather effectively refuted" the charges against him. At the same time, Dr. Healy quoted selectively from memoranda written by the committee members, attempting to trivialize the negative aspects of Dr. Gallo's conduct. Dr. Healy never acted on her committee's recommendation that Dr. Gallo be fired.
...
In the early Spring of 1992, while the Gallo case was still under review at the Public Health Service's Office of Scientific Integrity Review, Director Healy wrote to Dr. James Mason, HHS Assistant Secretary of Health, that HHS should take steps to:
"... clear Dr. Gallo's reputation with regard to accusations of misconduct -- and also to accusations that he knowingly and willfully misappropriated a French virus, for which there is no apparent evidence" (3/27/92 Healy-to-Mason memorandum; p. 6).
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Healy launched two further initiatives to redeem Dr. Gallo and the blood test patent. The first of these, a press conference for Dr. Gallo, to be held under the auspices of the NCI Cancer Board, was abruptly halted when HHS General Counsel Michael Astrue determined the meeting was "unauthorized and inappropriate" and
"... a guaranteed circus that will undermine years of effort to ensure public confidence in the fairness of this Department's review of the Gallo matter."
Dr. Healy's other initiative was no more successful, although it was far more costly. This initiative, a decidedly nonindependent review of the validity of the Gallo et al. blood test patent (the "Allegretti & Witcoff report"), cost American taxpayers nearly $150,000 (funded by the National Cancer Institute). The review relied almost entirely on information prepared by the NCI (particularly a "Statement of Material Facts," prepared by NCI patent attorney Thomas Mayes) and interviews with Dr. Gallo. The NCI "Statement of Material Facts" reflects numerous significant omissions, e.g., there was no mention of the LAI permanent cell lines nor of the "mystery virus," "MOV." At the same time, the NCI "Statement" contained the same demonstrably incorrect statements as previously propounded by NCI/HHS, e.g.,
"Gallo et al. obtained about 21 isolates of HTLV-III prior to September 1983, and approximately 7 more isolates during the month of September 1983" (NCI "Statement of Material Facts"; p. 7).
The Subcommittee staff's review of NCI's "Statement of Material Facts" showed it was nothing more than a modern-day version of the Fischinger Report. With the NCI "Statement" as a "fact base," it was not surprising that the Allegretti & Witcoff report pronounced the Gallo et al. blood test patent valid and entirely sound. Neither was it surprising that the report was no sooner received at NIH than it was immediately leaked to a friendly reporter at the Washington Post.
Dr. Healy led the United States' trustees of the French/American AIDS Foundation (FAAF) in adamantly rejecting the IP's request for a reallocation of the blood test patent royalties, in September 1992. HHS' rejection of the IP request, which was based on Dr. Gallo's belated 1991 admission that he used the IP virus to make the LTCB blood test, occurred despite the recommendation of HHS General Counsel Astrue. Shortly before the trustees' meeting, Astrue wrote to HHS Secretary Dr. Louis Sullivan that,
"... it would be in the public interest to relinquish future royalties" to the IP" (Astrue-to-Sullivan; approximate date 9/10/92; p. 4).
Astrue told Sullivan that the continuing French/American dispute
"... is and will continue to be if we let it, a considerable distraction both for key AIDS researchers and senior officials ... the controversy is a strain on our relations with the French ... the controversy ... has discouraged international scientific cooperation ... For two millions dollars a year for ten years, I think HHS is buying more negatives than positives" (op. cit., p. 4).
...
Meanwhile, Dr. Varmus was briefed by ORI and shown a large body of evidence indicating systematic, deliberate attempts by Dr. Gallo and some of his associates to mislead OSI investigators, including both withholding of vital evidence and alteration of evidence to remove potentially incriminating information. Dr. Varmus refused to consider the possibility of convening a Surgeon General's Board of Inquiry to deal with this matter; to date, no action has been taken by NIH/HHS.
2. Redistribution of Blood Test Royalties:
Dr. Varmus' actions concerning the redistribution of royalties were equally problematic. The decision on a possible reallocation was nominally that of HHS; however, officials at the Department made clear they would defer to Dr. Varmus as the principal decision-maker.
...
The royalties question had already been raised anew by the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. In January 1994, despite a presentation by the HHS OIG (see below), the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute Drs. Gallo and Popovic for a variety of potential criminal offenses relating to their HIV patents and the defense of those patents. Notwithstanding the declination decision, which was based on a number of technical issues, including the statute of limitations, the U.S. Attorney made clear some action concerning the royalties, possibly including recapture of royalties previously paid to Drs. Gallo and Popovic, might well be in order:
"Our decision not to seek prosecution of Drs. Gallo or Popovic does not mean that we believe they should continue to receive their annual royalty payments. On this issue, we express no opinion other than to observe that Dr. Gallo, as of approximately May of 1991, has acknowledged that it was the French Institute Pasteur sample sent to his lab which formed the basis for the AIDS test. Whether he and Dr. Popovic should continue to receive their royalties under such circumstances, or whether the government should make any effort to recoup any payments made to them since then, are matters which are more appropriately addressed by the Department of Health and Human Services" (1/10/94 Battaglia-to-Maddox letter; p. 3).
In closing her letter, the U.S. Attorney made pointed observations about the broader implications of Gallo/Popovic's actions:
"... we recognize that this case transcends the normal type of criminal case in that the conduct of these two noted scientists reflects upon the integrity of the scientific process, the National Cancer Institute, and indeed the conduct of our government as a whole."
Because of these broader issues, the HHS OIG, in a departure from its usual practices, decided to prepare a final report of its 2 1/2 year investigation, for presentation to Dr. Varmus and various PHS/ HHS officials, for consideration of any administrative actions they might deem appropriate. Dr. Varmus knew about the imminent issuance of the OIG report; yet on June 8, 1994, after remaining silent on the royalties question in the face of several additional letters from IP Director Schwartz, Varmus wrote to Schwartz that,
"... no alteration of our shared royalty arrangement is warranted."
Two days later, the HHS OIG report was signed, a report that made clear Dr. Gallo seriously failed in his duty of disclosure to PTO and made numerous statements -- in memoranda to HHS fact-finders, in published scientific papers, and in sworn legal statements -- that cannot be substantiated. HHS officials acknowledged to Subcommittee staff that Varmus' June 8 letter was written without his having seen the OIG report; the ostensible reason the June 8 letter was written without benefit of the OIG report was that Dr. Varmus did not wish to further delay responding to Dr. Schwartz. Yet previously, HHS officials and Dr. Varmus told Subcommittee staff they were awaiting the OIG report to ensure the royalties decision would be informed by the OIG's findings.
o After receiving an outraged response from Dr. Schwartz and (presumably) reviewing the OIG report, on June 23, Dr. Varmus wrote another letter to Dr. Schwartz. Varmus indicated HHS might be willing to entertain an IP proposal for an HHS acknowledgement that "the French virus was used by National Institutes of Health scientists in developing the American test kit." Yet Varmus strongly disputed the assertion in Dr. Schwartz's June 13 letter that,
"... a coverup of the true facts was deliberately undertaken so that we would settle ..."
Varmus' response was this:
"... I cannot fail to comment on the statement in your June 13 letter declaring that there has been deliberate U.S. Government behavior to your Institute's detriment. Neither the United States Attorney nor the Inspector General has established the deliberateness that you assume. None of the forums in which your cases were pending ever made a finding of deliberate misconduct by the Government."
Dr. Varmus, presumably, will find the Subcommittee's report illuminating.
In this regard, it bears mention that long before Dr. Varmus' deliberations on the royalties were concluded, Subcommittee staff briefed the HHS General Counsel about the Subcommittee investigation's findings indicating the strong likelihood of misconduct on the part of HHS scientists, officials, and attorneys. The General Counsel, who advised Dr. Versus throughout his deliberations, told Subcommittee staff she kept Dr. Varmus fully informed about the information provided to her by the staff. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend how Dr. Varmus could have made his strong denials of official misconduct.
After down-to-the-wire negotiations, threatened with the imminent filing of a new IP lawsuit, Dr. Varmus finally acceded to the IP proposal for a reallocation of blood test royalties more favorable to the IP. But in the process, Dr. Varmus and HHS showed that they still have not come to grips with the truth about the U.S. Government's misconduct during the French/American dispute.
Dr. Varmus' official statement about the royalties' reallocation, at the July 11, 1994 meeting of the French/American AIDS Foundation trustees, propounded the fiction that,
"The reallocation of royalties is being made because the U.S. has been collecting significantly more in royalties than France."
The only concession to the truth HHS and Dr. Varmus could bring themselves to make was an official acknowledgement, under heavy IP pressure, that -- as was known for years --
"... scientists at NIH used a virus provided to them by Institut Pasteur to invent the American test kit."
At a press conference following the trustees' meeting and in interviews with selected media, Dr. Varmus repeatedly denied that Dr. Gallo's conduct had any bearing on the reallocation decision. Dr. Varmus told the press conference that the question of deliberate use of the virus "was not part of today's decision," adding he did not expect any further action concerning Dr. Gallo at ORI. Dr. Varmus told Science magazine that,
"'We're not contemplating wrongdoing here'" (265, 1994, p. 313).
Concerning the OIG report, Dr. Varmus told the press conference the report had "very little" impact on his change of mind. Responding to a specific question, Varmus said that it was a change in his way of thinking about the royalties, between June 8 and June 23, that produced his more forthcoming letter on the later date. Yet after the press conference, Varmus told Science the OIG report,
"... had some catalytic role in my own thinking."
...
"... science is the pursuit of a truth that is external to our wishes. This truth is quite unlike the verdict of a court of law because it does not depend on advocacy" (John Cairn; Nature, 352, 1991, p. 101).
"This challenge to readdress the fundamental tenets of acceptable behavior in science comes at a time when the traditions of the scientific enterprise are under new threats arising from new stresses and temptations ... As a result, the scientific community may already be experiencing a gradual departure from the traditional scientific standards ... In this way we risk sliding down toward the standards of some other professions where the validity of action is decided by whether one can get away with it. For science to drift toward such a course would be fatal -- not only to itself and the inspiration which carries it forward, but to the public trust which is its provider" (Paul Doty; Nature, 352, 1991; p. 184).
There could be no better description of the disastrous consequences of the U.S. Government's defense of Gallo et al.Maintained by Walter W. Stewart
wstewart@nyx.net
last modified 030397The URL of this page is: http://www.nyx.net/~wstewart/CelebratedCases/GalloCase/ExeSumFolder/ExeSum.html